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probabilities when the mafia size is of order R . Then we give a theorem which 
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1. Introduction 
Mafia can be described as an experiment in human psychology and mass hysteria, or 
as a game between informed minority and uninformed majority. The history of mafia 
game can be traced to the 1970’s, when a game called Murder, which was the 
prototype of mafia game, had been played for many years [1]. This is a game which 
can train one’s expressive ability, discrimination ability, imagination ability and acting 
ability, etc. The game has common characteristics with many real life games, for 
example: workers, managers and stockholders at a company; students, teachers and 
management of a school; or citizens, the mafia and the police at a certain city. All of 
these games share the following three similar features: (1) each player may belong to 
one or more coalitions; (2) different groups make decision in different ways and take 
actions of different types; (3) different players accumulate information in different 
ways [2, 3]. 
According to the classification of games, the mafia game is a type of dynamic, 
partial information and group game. However, the previous works on the partial 
information and group games are mostly concerned with general definitions and 
abstract results in the context of extensive games. This line of research has not 
resulted in much quantitative analysis [3, 4]. Focus on a very restricted setting, 
Braverman, Etesami and Mossel obtained very precise results on the relative power of 
different groups. In particular, they first find a randomized strategy that is optimal in 
the absence of detectives, which leads to a stochastic asymptotic analysis using 
martingale arguments and the martingale stopping time theorem [5], where it is shown 
that the two groups have comparable winning probabilities when the mafia size is of 
order R . Then they propose a conjecture which states that the following phenomena 
should be valid in further generality: “In cases where there exists a distinguished 
group of size M that has complete information and acts at all rounds playing against a 
group of players of size R−M with no prior information that acts only at fraction α of 
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the rounds, it is expected that the two groups will have comparable winning 
probabilities if M = Rα ” [2]. 
This paper investigates the quantitative analysis of mafia game without detectives 
and adopts the same setting of mafia game as [2]. We first note that the main theorem 
given by Braverman, Etesami and Mossel can not hold under the conditions given by 
them. More important, by constructing an example, we indicate that even the holding 
of the theorem can not guarantee their conclusion, i.e., the two groups have 
comparable winning probabilities when the mafia size is of order R . Then through 
the establishment of a recursive formula, we build almost tight bounds of the winning 
probability and validate the conclusion of Braverman et al. In the last, by the proof of 
the conjecture proposed by Braverman, Etesami and Mossel, we generalize that this 
phenomenon is valid in a more extensive framework, of which the mafia game 
without detectives is only a special case. 
Section 2 introduces the main results developed by Mossel et al. and indicates the 
deficiencies of their works. In Section 3, by the establishment of a recursive formula 
of the winning probability, we derive almost tight bounds of winning probability 
using the technique of mathematical induction, which validates the phenomenon that 
in the mafia game without detectives, the citizens and mafias have comparable 
winning probabilities when the mafia size is of order square root of the size of the 
total population. In Section 4, by the proof of a conjecture proposed by Mossel et al., 
we generalize the mafia game to a more extensive framework. Section 5 studies the 
change the existence of detectives can bring to the qualitative behavior of the game, 
where the deficiencies of existed works and future research directions are discussed. 
Section 6 summarizes this paper. 
2. Existed Works and Deficiencies 
In the absence of detectives, Braverman, Etesami and Mossel found that the 
randomized strategy is optimal for both the citizens and mafias [2]. Given the optimal 
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strategies, suppose initially there are in all R players and M mafia members among the 
players, and let w(R, M) denote the probability that the mafias win the mafia game 
without detectives when both the citizens and mafias adopt their optimal strategies. 
By using the martingale argument in stochastic asymptotic analysis [5], Braverman et 
al. draw one of their main results as the following theorem [2]: 
Conclusion 1. There exists functions p : (0, ∞) → (0, 1) and q : (0, ∞) → (0, 1) such 
that if 0 < η < ∞, the number of residents R is sufficiently large and the mafia size 
satisfies M ∈ [η R , η R + 1] then  
p(η) ≤ w(R, M) ≤ q(η). 
Furthermore,  
1)(lim =
∞→
ηη p , 
and 
0)(lim
0
=
→
ηη q . 
And according to the above theorem, the authors draw the conclusion that when 
there are no detectives the mafias and citizens have comparable chance to win when 
the mafia size M is of order R . Moreover if M is a large multiple of R  then the 
chance that the mafias win is close to 1 and if it is a small multiple of R  then the 
chance that the mafias win is close to 0. 
However, we note that the theorem does not hold under the conditions given above, 
the authors may have thought some conditions for granted during their proof process 
and the conditions should be slightly changed to make the theorem holds. More 
important, it will be indicated that according to the theorem, we can not derive the 
conclusion that the two groups have comparable winning probability when the mafia 
size M is of order R . 
Claim 1. The function q: (0, ∞) → (0, 1) in conclusion 1 does not exist. 
Proof. We note that for any finite R, the function q does not exist. For example, if 
R≥η , then M≥η R ≥R, which means that all the players are mafias, so it is clear 
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that w(R, M)=1 when R≥η . Suppose there exists q: (0, ∞) → (0, 1) such that w(R, 
M) ≤ q(η), then when R≥η , 
q(η)≥ w(R, M) =1, 
this contradicts with q(η)<1, so the function q does not exist. It is worth noting that 
even if we let q: (0, ∞) → (0, 1], for any finite R, there still does not exist function q 
such that w(R, M) ≤ q(η) and 0)(lim
0
=→ ηη q . This is because when η<1/ R , then 
η R <1, according to M∈ [η R , η R + 1] and M is integer, we have M =1. So we 
have when η<1/ R , 
w(R, 1) ≤ q(η), 
then 
)1,()(lim
0
Rwq ≥→ ηη . 
It is clear that w(R, 1)>0 for any finite R, then we have 
0)(lim
0
>→ ηη q , 
this contradicts with 
0)(lim
0
=→ ηη q .   
It is clear that 
0)1,(lim =∞→ RwR , 
so 0)(lim
0
=→ ηη q  should be changed to: 
0)(limlim
0
=→∞→ ηη qR . 
Then conclusion 1 should be slightly changed as following: 
Conclusion 1’. There exists functions p : (0, ∞) → (0, 1) and q : (0, ∞) → (0, 1] such 
that if 0 < η < ∞, the number of residents R is sufficiently large and the mafia size 
satisfies M ∈ [η R , η R + 1] then 
p(η) ≤ w(R, M) ≤ q(η). 
Furthermore,  
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1)(lim =∞→ ηη p , 
and 
0)(limlim
0
=→∞→ ηη qR . 
However, we note that according to the holding of the above conclusion about 
winning probability, we can not arrive at the conclusion that the two groups have 
comparable winning probability when the mafia size M is of order R . We prove this 
point by constructing the following example: 
Example 1. Suppose  
w(R, M)=M/(R+M), 
we construct functions p: (0, ∞) → (0, 1) and q: (0, ∞) → (0, 1] as follows: let 
p(η)=η/(η+ R ). 
If η< R /2−1/ R , let 
q(η)=(η+1/ R )/(η+ R ); 
and if η≥ R /2−1/ R , let 
q(η)=1. 
Because R>0, it is clear that for any positive x and y, if x≥y, then 
x/(R+x)≥ y/(R+y). 
Since η R  ≤ M ≤ η R + 1, then we have: 
η R /(R+η R ) ≤ M/(R+M) ≤ (η R + 1)/(R+η R + 1)            (1) 
In Eq. (1), 
η R /(R+η R )=η/(η+ R )= p(η); 
(η R + 1)/(R+η R + 1)= (η+1/ R )/(η+ R +1/ R ) 
                   < (η+1/ R )/(η+ R )= q(η). 
Then according to Eq. (1) and M/(R+M) = w(R, M), we have 
p(η) ≤ w(R, M) ≤ q(η). 
And it is clear that 
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1lim)(lim =+= ∞→∞→ Rp η
ηη ηη  
and 
01lim/1limlim)(limlim
00
==+
+= ∞→→∞→→∞→ RR
Rq
RRR η
ηη ηη .   
It can be seen that w(R, M)=M/(R+M) and the functions p and q satisfy all the 
conditions in conclusion 1’. But it is clear that in this case only when M and R are in 
the same order, w(R, M) can be a comparable value with 1/2. So the holding of 
conclusion 1’ can not guarantee that the two groups have comparable winning 
probability when the mafia size M is of order R . Then what conditions should R and 
M satisfy to keep the two groups have comparable winning probabilities? The 
following section will answer this problem. 
3. Almost Tight Bounds of Winning Probability 
Suppose at the beginning of the game, there are in all n civilians and m mafias (here m 
and n+m correspond to the M and R in the above section respectively), let W(n, m) be 
the probability that the mafias win the game in the last. We note that in the mafia 
game without detectives, the randomized strategy is optimal for both sides only when 
the civilians are in majority of the players. When the mafias are in majority of the 
players, then no matter what strategy the civilians adopt, the mafias will surely win 
the game, which means that W(n, m)=1 if n<m. And it is clear that W(n, 0)=0 for any 
n>0. The left boundary case is n=1 and m=1, it is clear that in this case there will be a 
tie, since the civilian and mafia will vote each other. According to the rule adopted by 
Braverman, Etesami and Mossel, “In cases of a tie, the identity of the person to be 
killed is chosen uniformly at random among all players who received the maximal 
number of votes” [2], we should let W(1, 1)=0.5. 
If the civilians are in majority and both sides adopt their optimal strategy, then we 
have a recursive formula of W(n, m) as the following theorem: 
Theorem 1. In the mafia game without detectives, suppose initially there are n 
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civilians and m mafias, the civilians are in majority and both sides adopt their optimal 
randomized strategy. Let W(n, m) be the probability that the mafias win the game in 
the last, then we have: 
          )1,1(),2(),( −−++−+= mnWmn
mmnW
mn
nmnW                (2) 
holds for any n≥m≥1. 
Proof. The game consists of the iteration of the day round and the night round until 
the game terminates. If both sides adopt the randomized strategy, then in the day 
round every player has the equal chance to be voted to death. So in the vote round, 
one of the civilians is selected with probability n/(n+m) and one of the mafias is 
selected with probability m/(n+m). In the first case, in the night round one civilian is 
randomly selected to kill, so after the first iteration, there are n−2 civilians and m 
mafias left. In the second case, in the night round one civilian is randomly selected to 
kill, so after the first iteration, there are n−1 civilians and m−1 mafias left. So we have 
the recursive formula of W(n, m) as Eq. (2).   
It would be nice if we can derive the closed-form expression of W(n, m) according 
to Eq. (2). However, we note that the closed-form expression of W(n, m) is difficult to 
derive even if when m is very small. But we can get almost tight bounds of W(n, m) as 
the following theorem: 
Theorem 2. In the mafia game without detectives, suppose initially there are n 
civilians and m mafias, the civilians are in majority and both sides adopt their optimal 
randomized strategy. Let W(n, m) be the probability that the mafias win the game in 
the last, if m ≤ k and n+m ≤ R, then we have for any n≥m: 
   
mn
mRmnW
mn
m
k
k
+≤≤+
− 1001),(22 .                         (3) 
Proof. Since W(m−2, m)=W(m−1, m)=1, it is clear that W(n, m)≥
mn
m
k
k
+
− 22  
holds when n=m−2 and n=m−1 for any 1≤ m ≤ k. According to W(n, 0)=0, we have 
W(n, m)≥
mn
m
k
k
+
− 22  holds when m=0 for any 1≤ n. Suppose for some m≥0, 
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W(n, m)≥
mn
m
k
k
+
− 22  holds for any m−2≤ n. Then in the case m+1 (m+1≤k), we 
already have W(n, m+1)≥
mn
m
k
k
+
− 22  holds for n= m−1 and n=m, suppose for 
some t ≥ m, W(n, m+1)≥
mn
m
k
k
+
− 22  holds for any n≤ t, then we have: 
mtmt
mtm
k
k
mt
m
k
k
mt
m
mt
m
k
k
mt
t
mtW
mt
mmtW
mt
tmtW
+++
+++×−=
+
−×++
+++
+−×++
+≥
++
+++−++
+=++
)2(
)1)(1(22
22
2
1122
2
1
),(
2
1)1,1(
2
1)1,1(
                 (4) 
It is obvious that 
2
21)
2
11( 2 ++−≥++− mtmt                       (5) 
Eq. (5) is equivalent to 
2
)
2
1( 2 ++
+≥++
++
mt
mt
mt
mt , square root both sides, we have 
22
1
++
+≥++
++
mt
mt
mt
mt , divide both sides by mt +  and multiply both sides by 
)1(22 +− m
k
k , we have: 
       
2
)1(22
)2(
)1)(1(22
++
+×−≥+++
+++×−
mt
m
k
k
mtmt
mtm
k
k              (6) 
According to Eq. (4) and (6), W(t+1, m+1)≥
2
)1(22
++
+×−
mt
m
k
k  holds. 
According to the mathematical induction, we have W(n, m+1)≥
1
122
++
+−
mn
m
k
k  
holds for any n≥ m−1. Since from assumption, we have W(n, m)≥
mn
m
k
k
+
− 22  
holds for any m−2≤ n, again according to the mathematical induction, we can draw 
that 
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                 W(n, m)≥
mn
m
k
k
+
− 22                         (7) 
holds for any m ≤ k and n≥m−2. 
Since W(m−2, m)=W(m−1, m)=1 and 1)( 100
1
≥+mn , it is clear that W(n, m)≤ 
mn
mmn ++
100
1
)(  holds when n=m−2 and n= m−1 for any 1≤ m. According to W(n, 
0)=0, we have W(n, m) ≤
mn
mmn ++
100
1
)(  holds when m=0 for any 1≤ n. Through 
the computing using electronic computer, we can show that W(n, m) 
≤
mn
mmn ++
100
1
)(  holds for any n+m ≤ 100. Suppose for some m≥0, W(n, m) 
≤
mn
mmn ++
100
1
)(  holds for any m−2≤ n. Then in the case m+1, we already have 
W(n, m+1)≤
1
1)1( 100
1
++
+++
mn
mmn  holds for n=m−1, m and n+m+1 ≤ 100, suppose 
for some t ≥ max{m, 99−m}, W(n, m+1)≤
1
1)1( 100
1
++
+++
mn
mmn  holds for any n≤ t, 
then we have: 
mtmt
mtmmt
mt
mmt
mt
m
mt
mmt
mt
t
mtW
mt
mmtW
mt
tmtW
+++
+++×+=
++×++
+++
++×++
+≤
++
+++−++
+=++
)2(
)1)(1()(
)(
2
11)(
2
1
),(
2
1)1,1(
2
1)1,1(
100
1
100
1
100
1
         (8) 
To continue the proof, we first introduce the following inequality: 
n
nn
1
2
1
)21(11
−−≤−                           (9) 
holds for any integer n>2. Let 1)21()( 2
1
−+−= − xxxf x  (0≤ x <0.5), it is obvious 
that f(0)=0. And ))21ln(1()21(1)(' 2
1
xxxf
x −+−−= − , it is clear that if 0< x <0.5, 
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then f′(x)>0, so f(x)> f(0)=0 (0< x <0.5), which is equivalent to xxx −−<− 2
1
)21(1 . 
For integer n>2, let x=1/n, then we have n
nn
1
2
1
)21(11
−−≤−  holds. 
Since t+m+2>100, in Eq. (9), let n= t+m+2, we have: 
 2
1
2
1
)
2
21(
2
11 ++
−
++−≤++−
mt
mtmt
                     (10) 
Since 
100
1
2
1
2
1
2
1 −≥++− mt  and 12
21 <++− mt , then we have 
100
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
)
2
21()
2
21(
−++−
++−≤++− mtmt
mt  holds. According to Eq. (10), we arrive at 
100
1
2
1
)
2
21(
2
11
−
++−≤++− mtmt , which under transformation is equivalent to 
2
)2(
)2(
1)(
100
1
100
1
++
++≤+++
+++
mt
mt
mtmt
mtmt , both sides multiply with (m+1), we 
have 
2
)1()2(
)2(
)1)(1()( 100
1
100
1
++
+++≤+++
++++
mt
mmt
mtmt
mtmmt . According to Eq. (8), 
we have 
2
)1()2()1,1( 100
1
++
+++≤++
mt
mmtmtW  holds. According to the 
mathematical induction, we have W(n, m+1)≤
1
1)1( 100
1
++
+++
mn
mmn  holds for any 
n≥ m−1. Since from assumption we have W(n, m) ≤
mn
mmn ++
100
1
)(  holds for any 
m−2≤ n, again according to the mathematical induction, we can draw that 
W(n, m) ≤
mn
mmn ++
100
1
)(  
holds for any n≥m−2. Since n+m ≤ R, we have: 
W(n, m) ≤
mn
mmn ++
100
1
)(
mn
mR +≤
100
1
                    (11) 
Combining Eq. (7) and (11), we have if m ≤ k and n+m ≤ R, then for any n≥m, 
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mn
mRmnW
mn
m
k
k
+≤≤+
− 1001),(22  holds.   
If the number of players R is not very big, for example R≤1010, then 100
1
R  is very 
close to 1. Note that during the proof process, it can be seen that the constant index 
0.01 of R can be enhanced to be very small, say, 0.0001. Then according to theorem 2, 
it is very clear that the two groups have comparable winning probabilities only when 
the mafia size M is of order R .  
It is worth noting that the almost tight bounds we got here can explain the 
phenomena of experiments in [2]. Braverman et al. calculated the winning probability 
of a mafia of size M=η R  as a function of η, suppose the function is p(η), they 
draw the conclusion that: when η is small, then p(η) is almost linear; and when η is 
big, p(η) tends to 1. Theorem 2 can explicitly explain this phenomenon. According to  
R
MRMRW
R
M
k
k 100
1
),(22 ≤≤−  (in Eq. (3), let m=M and n+m=R), if η is small, 
then 
k
k 22 −  is close to 1, and the winning probability p(η) lies between 
k
k 22 − η and η, so it is almost linear; when η is big (for example, approaches 
22 −k
k ), then 
R
M
k
k 22 −  approaches 1, since ),(22 MRW
R
M
k
k ≤− , then it 
is clear that p(η) tends to 1. 
4. Generalization by Proof of a Conjecture 
Braverman, Etesami and Mossel claimed that the following phenomenon should be 
valid in further generality: “In cases where there exists a distinguished group of size 
M that has complete information and acts at all rounds playing against a group of 
players of size R−M with no prior information that acts only at fraction α of the 
rounds, it is expected that the two groups will have comparable winning probabilities 
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if M = Rα”. In particular, they propose the following conjecture [2]: 
Conjecture 1. Consider a variant of the mafia game without detectives, where each r 
rounds are partitioned into d day rounds and r−d night rounds. Then the two groups 
have comparable winning probabilities if M=Rd/r. 
Note that the mafia game without detectives is only a special case where d=1 and 
r=2. We give the following theorem to prove this conjecture: 
Theorem 3. Suppose there is a winning probability W(n, m) (0≤ W(n, m) ≤1), W(n, 
0)=0 (n>0) and if n< m, W(n, m)=1, and satisfies the following recursive formula (r 
and d are integers and r > d): 
             ),(),(),( dmdrnW
mn
mmrnW
mn
nmnW −+−++−+= .     (12) 
Then if m ≤ C1 and n+m ≤ C2, we have: 
r
d
r
d
mn
mCgmnW
mn
mCf
)(
)(),(
)(
)( 21
+
≤≤
+
                (13) 
Where f and g are functions with finite values. 
Proof. As the proof is very similar to that of Theorem 2, we shall only sketch it. 
Clearly we need only prove the following two inequalities. 
The first inequality is (with contrast to Eq. (5) in Theorem 2): 
dxrx r
d
−≤− 1)1(  for 0≤ x <1/r.                    (14) 
Let 1)1()( −+−= dxrxxp r
d
, it is clear that p(0)=0. And 
1
)1()('
−−−= r
d
rxddxp , 
since x <1/r and d<r, we have 
1
)1(
−− r
d
rx >1, then p′(x)<0, so p(x) < p(0)=0 (0< x 
<1/r), which is equivalent to dxrx r
d
−<− 1)1( . 
The second inequality is (with contrast to Eq. (9) in Theorem 2): 
                
dx
r
d
rxdx
−−≤− )1(1  for 0≤ x <1/r.                    (15) 
Let 1)1()( −+−= − dxrxxq dxr
d
, it is clear that q(0)=0. And 
)1)1(ln()1()(' +−−−= − rxrxddxq dxr
d
, 
since x <1/r and d<r, we have 
dx
r
d
rx
−− )1( <1 and (ln(1−rx)+1)<1, then q′ (x)>0, so 
 14
q(x) > q(0)=0 (0< x <1/r), which is equivalent to dxrx
dx
r
d
−>− − 1)1( .   
It is worth noting that the conditions, W(n, 0)=0 (n>0) and W(n, m)=1 if n<m, in 
Theorem 3 are prerequisite to the proof, because these conditions are the starting 
points of the mathematical induction, without the holding of the base, the conclusion 
may not be true. And if we do not consider the small cases (for example, n+ m ≤100), 
then the coefficients of the bounds (f(C1) and g(C2)) can be refined to be more 
accurate. 
5. Further Discussions and Open Problems 
Mossel et al. showed that even a single detective can change the qualitative behavior 
of the game dramatically. More formally they prove the following theorem [2]: 
Conclusion 2. (1) Consider the game with 1 detective and mafia of size M = ηR < 
R/49. Then for R sufficiently large the probability that the mafia wins denoted w(R, M, 
1) satisfies p(η, 1) ≤ w(R, M, 1) ≤ q(η, 1), where 0 < p(η, 1) < q(η, 1) < 1 for all η < 
1/49 and q(η, 1) → 0 as η → 0. 
(2) Let d ≥ 1 and consider the game with d detectives and mafia of size M = ηR, 
where η<1/2. Then for R sufficiently large, the probability that the mafia wins, 
denoted w(R, M, d) satisfies w(R, M, d) ≤ q(η, d), where for each η<1/2 it holds that 
∞→dlim q(η, d)= 0. 
They state that the theorem shows that even a single detective dramatically changes 
the citizen’s team power: While in the game with no detectives a mafia of size R1/2+ε 
will surely win, as soon as there is one detective, the mafia will lose unless it is of size 
Ω(R). 
However, we first note that the condition M = ηR in Conclusion 2 should be M ∈ 
[ηR, ηR+1] as in Conclusion 1, else M may not be an integer. Second, we show that 
0)1,(lim
0
=→ ηη q  should be changed to 0)1,(limlim 0 =→∞→ ηη qR . 
Claim 2. The function q in conclusion 2 does not exist. 
Proof. We will prove that for any finite R, there does not exist function q such that 
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w(R, M, 1) ≤ q(η, 1) for all η < 1/49 and 0)1,(lim
0
=→ ηη q . This is because when η<1/R 
(R>49 and is finite), then ηR <1, according to M∈ [ηR, ηR+ 1] and M is integer, we 
have M =1. So we have when η<1/R, 
w(R, 1, 1) ≤ q(η, 1), 
then 
)1,1,()1,(lim
0
Rwq ≥→ ηη . 
It is clear that w(R, 1, 1)>0 for any finite R, then we have 
0)1,(lim
0
>→ ηη q , 
this contradicts with 
0)1,(lim
0
=→ ηη q .   
It is clear that 
0)1,1,(lim =∞→ RwR , 
so 0)1,(lim
0
=→ ηη q  should be changed to: 
0)1,(limlim
0
=→∞→ ηη qR . 
Then conclusion 2 should be slightly changed as following: 
Conclusion 2’. (1) Consider the game with 1 detective and mafia of size M∈ [ηR, 
ηR+ 1], where η< R/49. Then for R sufficiently large the probability that the mafia 
wins denoted w(R, M, 1) satisfies p(η, 1) ≤ w(R, M, 1) ≤ q(η, 1), where 0 < p(η, 1) < 
q(η, 1) < 1 for all η < 1/49 and 0)1,(limlim
0
=→∞→ ηη qR . 
(2) Let d ≥ 1 and consider the game with d detectives and mafia of size M∈ [ηR, 
ηR+ 1], where η<1/2. Then for R sufficiently large, the probability that the mafia wins, 
denoted w(R, M, d) satisfies w(R, M, d) ≤ q(η, d), where for each η<1/2 it holds that 
∞→dlim q(η, d)= 0. 
However we note that the holding of the first part of conclusion 2 can not guarantee 
that even a single detective dramatically changes the citizen’s team power: as soon as 
there is one detective, the mafia will lose unless it is of size Ω(R). We construct the 
following example to prove this: 
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Example 2. Suppose  
w(R, M, 1)=M/( R +M), 
we construct functions p(η, 1) and q(η, 1) as follows: let 
p(η, 1)= ηR /(ηR + R ), 
q(η, 1)=(ηR +1)/(ηR +1+ R ). 
Because R >0, it is clear that for any positive x and y, if x≥y, then 
x/( R +x)≥ y/( R +y). 
Since ηR ≤ M ≤ ηR + 1, then we have: 
ηR /(ηR + R ) ≤ M/( R +M) ≤ (ηR +1)/(ηR +1+ R ), 
According to the definition, we have 
p(η, 1) ≤ w(R, M, 1) ≤ q(η, 1). 
And it is clear that 
0
1
1lim
1
1limlim)1,(limlim
00
=+=++
+= ∞→→∞→→∞→ RRR
Rq
RRR η
ηη ηη .   
It can be seen that w(R, M, 1)= M/( R +M) and the functions p and q satisfy all the 
conditions in part 1 of conclusion 2’. But it is clear that in this case only when M and 
R  are in the same order, w(R, M, 1) can be a comparable value with 1/2. So the 
holding of part 1 of conclusion 2’ can not guarantee that as soon as there is one 
detective, the mafia will lose unless it is of size Ω(R). 
We then give the following example to show that the condition ∞→dlim q(η, d)= 0 in 
the part 2 of Conclusion 2’ is obvious and can not explain any phenomenon. 
Example 3. Suppose  
w(R, M, d)=M/(M+f(R, d)), 
where f(R, d)>0 and satisfies ∞→dlim f(R, d)= ∞. Let 
q(η, d)=(ηR +1)/(ηR +1+ f(R, d)). 
Because f(R, d)>0, it is clear that for any positive x and y, if x≥y, then 
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x/( f(R, d)+x)≥ y/( f(R, d)+y). 
Since ηR ≤ M ≤ ηR + 1, then we have: 
M/(M+f(R, d)) ≤ (ηR +1)/(ηR +1+ f(R, d)), 
According to the definition, we have 
w(R, M, d) ≤ q(η, d). 
And it is clear that 
0
),(1
1lim),(lim =++
+= ∞→∞→ dRfR
Rdq
dd η
ηη .   
It can be seen that w(R, M, d)=M/(M+f(R, d)) and the function q satisfy all the 
conditions in part 2 of conclusion 2’. But it is clear that in this case when M and any 
f(R, d) (i.e., f(R, d)= d + R  or f(R, d)=d2) are in the same order, w(R, M, d) can be a 
comparable value with 1/2. So the holding of part 2 of conclusion 2’ can not guarantee 
that the existence of detectives can dramatically change the citizen’s team power. It 
would be interesting to investigate what changes the existence of detectives can take 
to the qualitative behavior of the game. 
6. Conclusion 
In the mafia game without detectives, when both the citizens and mafias adopt the 
optimal randomized strategy, we focus on the winning probabilities of different 
groups. By developing almost tight bounds of the winning probability, we validate the 
phenomenon that the two groups have comparable winning chances when the total 
player size is R and the mafia size is of order R . By the proof of a conjecture, we 
generalize the mafia game to the following extensive framework: In cases where there 
exists a distinguished group of size M that has complete information and acts at all 
rounds playing against a group of players of size R−M with no prior information that 
acts only at fraction α of the rounds, then the two groups have comparable winning 
probabilities if M = Rα. 
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